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Sovereignty, Intervention and Social Order in Revolutionary 
Times 
LEE JONES 
 
Abstract. This article explores how sovereignty and (non)intervention are implicated in the (re)production of 
specific social orders. Sovereignty and the non-interference principle circumscribe ‘domestic’ politics from ‘the 
international’, defining who is legitimately included or excluded from the struggles that determine political and 
social orders. State managers seek to admit forces and resources favourable to the order they are seeking to 
create, whilst excluding those deleterious to it. In revolutionary periods, however, these attempts to ‘cage’ social 
relations often crumble as transnational forces engage in fierce, multifaceted conflicts overlapping territorial 
borders. In such circumstances, both norms of non-interference and practices of intervention may be used by 
dominant forces to help contain the spread of socio-political conflict and to strengthen their hand in the struggle 
to (re)define social order. Sovereignty regimes are thus shaped by the strategies and ideologies of the various 
social groups locked in conflict at a particular historical moment. This argument is illustrated through the case 
of Cold War Southeast Asia, where sovereignty and intervention were both used to stabilise capitalist social 
order and curtail transnational, radical threats from below. 
 
Lee Jones is senior lecturer in international politics in the School of Politics and International 
Relations, Queen Mary University of London. His research focuses on the relationship between socio-
political conflict and international intervention and governance. His publications include ASEAN, 
Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article advances the central claim of this special issue – that intervention coercively 
mediates contradictions between territorial state sovereignty and transnational social forces – 
by examining the way sovereignty and intervention are used to manage socio-political order 
during revolutionary historical periods.
1
 It concurs that intervention is used to uphold or 
change order in target states, but also makes two additional arguments. First, sovereignty 
itself, not merely intervention, is part of the modern ‘will to order’. Establishing territorial 
state sovereignty is not neutral or automatic. By defining an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, it 
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defines the legitimate scope of socio-political conflict, limiting it to a fixed population, 
excluding other forces as ‘external’, and demanding that politics be mediated solely through 
the institutions of the ‘nation-state’. Sovereignty is directly implicated in fashioning certain 
orders whilst disabling others with local or ‘transnational’ social bases not corresponding to 
territorial borders. Those pursuing such alternatives have often been violently suppressed, 
whilst state managers insist on their sovereign right to ‘non-interference’. Pace Vincent, this 
right protects not merely state sovereignty, and by extension the international states system, 
but also the domestic order that sovereignty enables and defends.
2
 
 Secondly, intervention is not simply used to manage international order, or domestic 
order in the target state, but also to manage order within the intervening state, or elsewhere. 
Despite state managers’ coercive efforts to ‘cage’ and ‘contain’ social relations within a 
‘national’ context, transnational social relations persist; consequently, no social order is an 
island. Political, social and economic linkages between ‘national’ orders mean that what 
happens in one territory may be profoundly influenced by struggles elsewhere. This article 
focuses on revolutionary periods because they emblematise this societal interdependence. 
Where state managers perceive that the domestic order they are seeking to create or maintain 
is threatened by forces transnationally linked to conflicts elsewhere, they may seek to 
intervene in these conflicts abroad in order to bolster their chances of success at home, and/or 
to assist allied elites elsewhere. Thus, in the European Concert period, the Holy Alliance 
intervened to crush liberal-nationalist revolutions in order to prevent them spreading to their 
own multinational empires; US Cold War interventions, inspired by the ‘domino theory’, 
defended capitalist social order globally; and Saudi Arabia’s contemporary intervention in 
Bahrain seeks to neuter the transnational Shia threat to Saudis’ despotic regime. Thus, rather 
than simply being seen as an exception to sovereignty, intervention may actually be used to 
complement it, by containing transnational threats to domestic order.  
 The article uses a historical-sociological approach, tracing patterns of sovereignty and 
intervention to struggles between social forces over what sort of political and economic order 
should prevail. The first section develops the claims above, theorising the strategic functions 
of sovereignty and intervention for state managers in defining the scope of socio-political 
conflict. The second section illustrates the argument through a study of Cold War Southeast 
Asia, focusing on the practices of capitalist states. Here, elites struggling to (re)produce 
national-capitalist orders developed a strong norm of state sovereignty in an effort to dampen 
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inter-elite tensions and strengthen their state-making efforts against radical challenges from 
below. Moreover, by insisting on ‘non-interference’ by ‘external’ forces, elites sought to 
sever the transnational linkages between their leftist opponents and their fellow-travellers 
abroad, and thereby tilt the balance against them. However, given the transnational strength 
of communism in the region, elites also felt it necessary to intervene against radical forces 
beyond their borders to constrain transnational assistance to their domestic enemies. Hence, 
sovereignty and intervention were combined to defend capitalist social order. 
 
Sovereignty, Intervention and Social Ordering 
 
This section argues that the creation and maintenance of sovereign statehood and its violation 
through intervention are never neutral but always advance the interests, agendas and 
preferred orders of some social forces over others. Claiming sovereignty and its corollary 
norm of non-intervention is to define who is included in or excluded from the struggles that 
determine order within a given space. Sovereignty thereby enables certain political orders – 
notably, those based upon a fixed territory and population – whilst disabling others – 
including those based on solidarities overlapping territorial borders, such as class, ethnicity 
and religion. Thus, demands for non-intervention aim not simply to defend state sovereignty, 
but also the socio-political order it enables and upholds. Interventions are similarly partisan 
because they change the balance of forces struggling for power within a political community. 
Regimes of sovereignty and intervention should thus be traced to – and their consequences 
evaluated for – social forces contesting political order in specific historical periods. When 
social conflict is low in intensity or has limited transnational repercussions, sovereignty 
claims often suffice to contain the scope of political conflict and maintain orders that might 
otherwise be swept away. However, during revolutionary periods, transnational social 
conflicts tend to trump sovereignty, generating frequent interventions to manage social order 
within target states and beyond. 
 
The Ordering Functions of Sovereignty and Intervention 
 
International Relations scholars’ concern with interstate dynamics leads most to take 
sovereign states as their starting ‘units’ and then seek to explain interactions amongst them. 
They have thus asked, for example, when and why states intervene into others’ domestic 
affairs, but more rarely asked what is at stake in defining these affairs as ‘domestic’ in the 
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first place. Historians and others interested in state-formation processes conversely show how 
sovereign states emerged via conflict-ridden, violent processes whereby some forces and 
projects defeated others. In these processes sovereignty is fundamentally about enabling 
certain social orders to emerge, whilst disabling others, by defining who is to be included or 
excluded from struggles to determine what order should prevail. Conversely, by admitting 
additional forces and resources, intervention changes the balance of forces, again in an effort 
to manipulate political outcomes. 
In Europe, state sovereignty first emerged as monarchs struggled to assert and 
consolidate their domains against feudal lords, whose inter-personal obligations cut across 
monarchic domains, the Catholic church, with claims to universal authority across 
Christendom, and city-states founded on ‘transnational’ mercantile networks.3 Sovereign 
statehood emerged only gradually, through violent contestation, as monarchs carved out 
coherent domains from a medieval ‘patchwork’, forcibly unifying geographical space, society 
and economic flows into increasingly ‘national’ spatial formations under their hegemony.4 
Sovereignty claims were thus used to create a historically-specific social order and defeat 
‘transnational’ alternatives.  
Following the French Revolution, national-popular sovereignty became the main 
ideological basis of sovereignty claims. Demands for national self-determination posit the 
pre-existence of a unified national community that deserves recognition as a sovereign unit. 
Historically, however, the national unity used to justify sovereignty rarely, if ever, preceded 
it. Instead nations were largely ‘created after borders... by ethnic cleansing or expulsions, 
forced assimilation, and other planned and spontaneous efforts at cultural homogenisation’.5 
State power confronts disparate populations within its territory, many of whom may belong to 
transboundary ethnic, religious or class formations, and seeks to unify them, often forcibly. 
Sovereignty does not express national unity but is asserted to create political conditions 
enabling its coercive production.  
By seeking to ‘cage’ social forces, severing their transnational linkages and forcibly 
orienting populations towards new state institutions, modern sovereignty deliberately 
delegitimises and disrupts alternative orders based on transnational social formations and 
solidarities. These include socialism and transnational class solidarity, ‘the Islamic umma, 
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pan-racial movements, various regional formations... anti-colonial internationalism including 
the Tricontinental movement, transnational diasporic communities, international women’s 
movements, indigenous groupings, and, of course, liberal cosmopolitanism’.6 Such 
alternatives have often been violently suppressed in the name of ‘state security’. Meanwhile, 
state managers, having defined the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of a political community,7 insist that 
forces now defined as ‘external’, including those transnationally linked to groups within the 
state’s territory, do not ‘intervene’ in what are now identified as solely ‘domestic’ political 
conflicts.
8
  
Thus, at stake in whether this demand is respected, or violated through intervention, is 
not simply a legal principle, or international order, but which forces and resources should be 
permitted to contribute to struggles to determine order within a given territory. A regime 
facing insurgent resistance to a nation-making project will insist on ‘non-intervention’ by 
others if it calculates that the prevailing balance of forces within a strictly ‘national’ context 
favours itself. Conversely, its opponents will seek intervention to draw in allies and resources 
to strengthen their hand, often by rejecting state elites’ inside/outside distinction and 
mobilising transnational solidarities. If the regime becomes sufficiently embattled, it may 
invite intervention from its own transnational allies,
9
 whilst still insisting on ‘non-
intervention’ by its opponents’. Such struggles to define the limits of sovereignty and 
intervention is never neutral, but always intrinsically partisan: 
 
The presumption in favour of security, i.e., of those already in power, entails one conception 
of world order; the presumption against security entails the other – solidarity with the 
oppressed, and, where apposite, non-interference by counter-revolution… What appears as a 
normative debate about international relations, and the pros and cons of intervention, conceals 
another, anterior, debate about the rights and wrongs of states themselves.
10 
 
Intervention and Revolution 
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Who prevails in these struggles over sovereignty and intervention depends heavily upon 
prevailing international constellations of power, interests and ideology. Here, non-
revolutionary and revolutionary historical periods differ considerably. In the former, because 
the intensity of social conflict is low, ‘domestic’ conflicts may carry few repercussions for 
external forces. Consequently, established procedures of diplomatic recognition may prevail, 
bolstering the ‘caging’ of social conflict within state borders.11 However, in revolutionary 
periods, the transnational nature and repercussions of social conflict are heightened, making 
intervention likelier as parties to domestic struggles activate transnational solidarities. 
Revolution carries these consequences because states have never truly ‘caged’ social 
relations. The very formation of national societies and economies generated new 
transnational relations, notably the social, economic and ideological forces of industrial 
capitalism: international working and capitalist classes; liberalism and socialism.
12
 Other 
transnational formations, including religions and ethnicities, were never truly caged but 
continued to overlap state boundaries. Consequently, social, political and economic order in 
one state is never entirely divorced from order elsewhere. If state managers believe that order 
within their territory depends on the outcome of struggles elsewhere, they may feel impelled 
to intervene and manage these struggles in a direction favourable to dominant societal 
interests at home. 
 This imperative is apparent even in non-revolutionary periods. Contemporary state-
building interventions, for example, are arguably driven by a perceived need to contain and 
manage transnational flows and risks arising from ‘weak’ states.13 Current EU/IMF 
interventions in Greece and Cyprus seek to contain financial chaos there in order to stabilise 
the wider Eurozone. During revolutionary periods, however, transnational social relations 
acquire even greater importance. Local forces and conflicts become articulated within 
regional or even global struggles, turning them into transnational struggles between 
contending socio-political blocs located in multiple territories.
14
 Transnational identities and 
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conflicts may unite contending forces across borders, increasing the opportunities for local 
forces to draw allied ‘outsiders’ into their conflicts. ‘Outsiders’ also face increased incentives 
to intervene, since the outcome of political struggle in one territory is increasingly perceived 
to carry direct consequences for transnationally related conflicts elsewhere. Frequently, in 
cases like the Spanish Civil War and Vietnam War, sovereignty norms are discarded as both 
sides are backed by their transnational allies, generating ‘internationalised civil war’.15  
In revolutionary periods, then, intervention is not merely used to stabilise or transform 
social order in target states, but also elsewhere, including perhaps the intervening state itself, 
by limiting the ‘contagion’ of (counter)revolution to other, transnationally-linked societies. 
As Rosenberg observes, ‘a counter-revolutionary foreign policy is rarely just a foreign 
policy... it is also directed inwards, a nationalist identification of certain programmes of 
political change with a foreign threat’.16 Whether such contagion is objectively likely or 
whether intervention is effective is besides the point. Elite paranoia may often exaggerate the 
linkages between internal opposition and external ‘subversion’, and intervention is a blunt, 
frequently counterproductive instrument.
17
 Nonetheless, it suffices to explain intervention 
that decision-makers perceive it to be necessary to manage social order elsewhere.  
Thus, for example, in the ‘Concert’ period of nineteenth-century Europe, conflict 
between aristocratic-monarchic forces and bourgeois and middle-class revolutionaries had 
important transnational dimensions. Fearing the spread of liberal, nationalist revolution to 
their own multinational empires, the Holy Alliance policed European-wide social order by 
intervening whenever monarchic regimes were threatened by revolution.
18
 Cold War 
sovereignty regimes reflected the transnational struggle between the organised left and its 
opponents. The Western ‘domino theory’ that communist victory in one territory would spark 
more elsewhere by assisting leftists and demoralising status-quo forces generated explicit 
‘containment’ interventions. The US supported sovereign states insofar as they upheld 
capitalist social relations, but intervened when they were threatened.
19
 Inversely, whilst the 
Soviet Union and China intervened to support some allied communist and left-nationalist 
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movements elsewhere, the Brezhnev doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’ threatened military 
intervention in Eastern Europe in the event of counter-revolutionary forces seizing control. 
Following the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia intervened to suppress pro-democracy protests in 
Bahrain and covertly arm the Syrian opposition, while simultaneously asserting the Gulf 
monarchies’ inviolable sovereignty. These practices partly reflect attempts to manage 
transnational struggles between pro- and anti-democratic and Sunni and Shia social forces. In 
Bahrain, intervention bolstered a Sunni monarchy against a Shia-led uprising, to contain the 
spread of unrest to Saudi Arabia’s own Shia population. In Syria, the Saudis hope to unseat 
forces allied to Iran, seen as the ‘snake’s head’ of Shia unrest and revolution and their main 
competitor for Arab loyalties.
20
  
In revolutionary times, then, struggles over whether sovereignty is to be respected or 
violated – and by whom – are particularly clearly undergirded by transnational struggles over 
the nature of social, economic and political order in particular territories. Defining who can 
participate in these struggles by wielding sovereignty or practicing intervention is one means 
by which contending forces pursue the stabilisation or transformation of social order. Tracing 
sovereignty and intervention practices to these struggles is arguably more helpful than the IR 
literature’s most widely-cited treatment: Krasner’s argument that sovereignty is ‘organised 
hypocrisy’, simply discarded whenever the ‘utility’ to rulers outweighs the costs.21 First, it 
can identify historical patterns of sovereignty/ intervention, rather than merely chronicling 
endless violations of sovereignty as proof that interests trump norms. Krasner’s cost-benefit 
analysis approach creates a misleading impression of a free-for-all, where international norms 
and practices may fluctuate wildly depending on the immediate payoffs to rulers. Conversely, 
historical analysis suggests the existence of ‘sovereignty regimes’22 which, while variable and 
evolving, are relatively stable and patterned. Secondly, sociological analysis helps explain 
such patterns. Krasner argues that intervention occurs whenever it serves rulers’ interests, but 
his realist, statist ontology provides no elaboration of what these are, beyond vague 
references to rulers’ ‘constituents’.23 Conversely, the approach offered here traces 
interventions to the historically-specific societal groups which operate through states. 
Interventions are explained as partisan instruments of social conflict, not merely as rational-
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choice decisions by policymakers. This approach may also explain why sovereignty regimes 
are historically patterned: they relate to social structures, interests and ideologies that are 
relatively durable. This analysis can now be applied to a case study. 
 
Non-Interference and Intervention in Cold War Southeast Asia 
 
This section explores the practices of sovereignty and intervention by the capitalist member-
states of ASEAN during the Cold War. To examine intervention by third-world states may 
appear counter-intuitive, since they are typically understood as clinging fiercely to non-
intervention. Ayoob observes of the Westphalian norms of ‘rigidly demarcated and 
sacrosanct boundaries, mutual recognition of sovereign political entities, and non-
intervention in the affairs of other states’ that ‘third-world elites have internalised these 
values to an astonishing degree’.24 Asian states are particularly thought to remain ‘at the 
forefront of resistance to post-Westphalianism’; indeed, it is often suggested that a ‘naked 
pursuit of Westphalian sovereignty epitomise[s] the essence of Asian security [practices]’.25 
ASEAN is particularly renowned for its regional norm of ‘non-interference’, which has been 
traced to principles first articulated at the Bandung conference and is typically said to rigidly 
guide member-states’ conduct.26  
However, historical-sociological analysis suggests a rather different story, centred on 
the interests of counter-revolutionary forces and their capitalist state-making projects. Sub-
regional elites’ emphasis of sovereignty was designed to dampen inter-elite tensions and 
assist them in combating the left by excluding its transnational allies from participating in 
struggles over social order within their territories. However, insisting on state sovereignty 
was insufficient to serve these counter-revolutionary purposes. Consequently, state managers 
also intervened abroad to bolster their allies and weaken their opponents’, with the ultimate 
goal of stabilising their own domestic social orders. The first subsection briefly outlines the 
transnational contestation of postwar order in Southeast Asia to provide a sense of the 
historical and social context. The second shows how sovereignty norms were invoked to try 
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to bolster capitalist and nationalist state-formation by severing transnational solidarities and 
excluding ‘external’ forces. The third illustrates how intervention in Indochina sought to 
complement these efforts. 
 
Contested Capitalist State-Making 
 
As elsewhere, post-colonial state-formation in Southeast Asia involved assembling national 
societies and economies from myriad local and transnational relations. Establishing new 
territorial states with supposedly homogenous populations was particularly difficult because 
centuries of trade, migration, cultural transfers, war and imperialism had produced enormous 
diversity in ethnicity, language and religion that did not correspond to the borders established 
by departing colonial powers. Particularly in uplands and borderlands, state authority was 
non-existent and popular loyalties were frequently local or transboundary, not national.
27
 
Except in rare cases where independence was won through armed revolution (Indonesia, 
Vietnam) ruling elites, often guided into position by colonial officials, were a mixture of 
royals, aristocrats, politico-businessmen and middle-class professionals who struggled to 
mobilise broad-based popular support for capitalist, nationalist state-formation.  
Moreover, the legacy of widespread radicalisation under the Japanese wartime 
occupation was a strong current of left-nationalism and communism among many workers, 
peasants and intellectuals, subsequently strengthened by communist victory in China in 1949 
and Vietnam’s defeat of France in 1954. Importantly, this current had strong transnational 
dimensions. Vietnamese nationalists, for example, established a Southeast Asian League in 
1947 to resist colonialism; headquartered in Bangkok, it included representatives from 
Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. The Viet 
Minh’s struggle was also partly financed by overseas Vietnamese trading networks in 
Thailand.
28
 Moreover, as Cold War rivalries emerged, liberation struggles frequently became 
articulated within them, with nationalist movements tacking leftwards and identifying with 
the broader anti-imperialist bloc.
29
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Communist insurgencies had also broken out by the early 1950s in Indochina, Burma, 
Malaya and the Philippines, sparking elite fears of a Soviet-directed offensive. These were 
unfounded: leftist movements were firmly rooted in local political, economic and social 
contradictions. Nonetheless, this perception reflected communism’s genuinely transnational 
nature: communist parties enjoyed fraternal relations, were networked through the 
Comintern, and their class-based ideology transcended territorial boundaries. Chinese 
military assistance to the Viet Minh was critical in its struggle against French imperialism. In 
turn, the Viet Minh, was a front of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which treated 
Indochina as a ‘single battlefield’, not as distinct sovereign countries. Even when the ICP 
formally dissolved into national communist parties, intimate transnational ties remained and 
the Vietnamese Communist Party retained a vanguard role, coordinating the struggle of leftist 
forces in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam.
30
 The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) 
similarly described its struggle as ‘one part of the world revolution of the working class’, 
arguing that ‘the working class must support one another... we strive for support from other 
countries, at the same time as we carry out our international duty to assist the revolutionary 
struggles of other countries’. The CPT later received material assistance from fellow-
travellers in China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia.
31
 The Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP), which enjoyed widespread support from ethnic-Chinese peasants and workers 
by 1945, was initially established – apparently with Ho Chi Minh’s involvement – as the 
Nanyang (South Sea) Communist Party, an overseas branch of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP).
32
 The MCP later received training and logistical support from China and North 
Vietnam.
33
 The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had undertaken efforts to spread 
communism throughout the Malay world even before WWII. By 1965, it was the largest 
communist party outside the Soviet Union and China, with three million members and twelve 
million in affiliated organisations. It drew support from Beijing.
34
  
 Indeed, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a central node in these 
transnational networks, establishing party-to-party ties that lasted until the early 1980s. 
Alongside this, the PRC had extended citizenship to all ‘overseas Chinese’ in 1949, 
encompassing Southeast Asia’s large and economically-dominant ethnic-Chinese residents. 
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Many in the diaspora viewed China as their homeland, and had become politicised by and 
helped finance China’s struggle against Japanese imperialism. Consequently, indigenous anti-
communist elites perceived them – often incorrectly – as having dubious loyalties, even as 
potential ‘fifth columns’ of Chinese communism. This suspicion was heightened by the 
predominantly ethnic-Chinese membership of communist parties in Malaysia, Singapore and 
initially Thailand. The ethnic-Chinese were integrated only gradually into the new nations, 
their loyalty doubted well after any objective threat from communism had receded.
35
 The 
foreign minister of Thailand, where ethnic-Chinese were comparatively well integrated, 
remarked as late as the mid-1960s that ‘the three million Chinese in Thailand would turn to 
the communists at the drop of a hat’.36 Despite these fears, party-to-party links were more 
important than diasporic links. Regardless of their ethnic membership, most Southeast Asian 
communist parties followed Beijing’s line, particularly after the Sino-Soviet split, received 
modest Chinese aid, and some, like the Communist Party of the Philippines, were strongly 
influenced by Maoism and the upsurge in revolutionary internationalism associated with the 
Cultural Revolution.
37
  
 Unsurprisingly, therefore, post-colonial capitalist state-formation in Southeast Asia 
was centred on anti-communist struggle.
38
 This involved efforts to sever transnational social 
relations endangering this process, homogenising societies and redirecting loyalties towards 
national state institutions. For Singapore’s foreign minister this ‘required that we perform 
some sort of collective lobotomy’.39 The head of Thailand’s Internal Security Operations 
Command described state-making thusly: ‘we colonised our own people’.40 Coercion was 
particularly directed at social groups traversing Thailand’s borders, such as ethnic Laotians 
and Lao-speakers – who comprised a third of Thailand’s population41 – ethnic Meo and 
Vietnamese in the northeast, hill tribes in the north, and Malay Muslims in the south. Like the 
Chinese, these transnational groups were seen as potential ‘fifth columns’, conduits through 
which communism might ‘infect’ wider Thai society; indeed, they were early supporters of 
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the CPT.
42
 Throughout the Cold War, with extensive US assistance, Thai elites constructed 
the ‘body politic’ and Thai identity – centred on the monarchy – to effectively exclude the 
CPT, and indeed the republican left, from inclusion in Thai citizenship.
43
 
 The use of sovereignty to cut across transnational formations and create conditions 
favourable to a particular form of social order is also illustrated in the creation of Malaysia, 
which amalgamated Britain’s colonies in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. Britain had 
launched a brutal colonial war, the Emergency (1948-1960) to suppress the MCP. It handed 
power in Malaya to a government dominated by Malay aristocrats determined to suppress 
communism and maintain Malay political dominance against a very large ethnic-Chinese 
minority. However, the left’s star was rising in neighbouring, predominantly ethnic-Chinese 
Singapore, British Borneo, and Indonesia, where the left-nationalist Sukarno government was 
increasingly dependent on the PKI. To disrupt the growing transboundary alliance between 
these left-populist forces, Britain sought to combine its territories into a ‘Malaysian 
Federation’, within which capitalist social order could be maintained. Without such 
incorporation, London feared, an independent Singapore and Borneo would be absorbed by 
either Indonesia or China. If Singapore became ‘an outpost of China’, Britain would lose its 
military base, endangering the defence of capitalism as far away as Australia.
44
 Singapore’s 
embattled anti-communist elites also favoured merger so that the Malaysian government 
could suppress their leftist enemies for them. Malayan elites initially demurred, fearing the 
incorporation of so many leftists and ethnic-Chinese, but eventually agreed that merger was 
essential to prevent the emergence of a Singaporean ‘Cuba’ that could help revive the ailing 
MCP. However, they also insisted on absorbing Britain’s Borneo territories and their 
predominantly non-Chinese populations, in order to maintain Malays’ numerical supremacy, 
and thus their own political dominance.
45
  
 This was, however, fiercely and transnationally contested. Singapore’s Socialist 
Front, rightly fearing its annihilation, staunchly opposed the merger. In Borneo, the 
Federation proposal provoked an armed revolt by the left-nationalist People’s Party of Brunei 
                                                 
42
 Telegram from the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, 29 March 1963, in Edward C. Keefer 
(ed.) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XXIII (Washington, DC: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 990-993. 
43
 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1994). 
44
 Albert Lau, ‘Decolonization and the Cold War in Singapore, 1955-9’, in Lau (ed.), Southeast Asia, p. 46; 
Joseph M. Fernando, ‘The Cold War, Malayan Decolonization and the Making of the Federation of Malaysia’, 
in Lau (ed.), Southeast Asia, pp. 70-71, 78. 
45
 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, 
Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 62-75, 102. 
14 
 
and the Sarawak Communist Organisation in 1962. Britain militarily intervened militarily to 
crush the uprising. The rebellion, and subsequent guerrilla resistance, gained transboundary 
support from Indonesian leftists, including the PKI, army units and local government 
officials, who provided weapons, training and sanctuary for a ‘North Kalimantan People’s 
Force’ incorporating members from Borneo and Indonesia.46 By 1964, the PKI’s hostility to 
Malaysia had dragged the Indonesian state into armed ‘Confrontation’ against the federation, 
which Sukarno denounced as a ‘neo-colonialist’ plot. This was initially supported by some 
Indonesian rightists for fear that Malaysia could serve as a communist Chinese springboard 
adjacent to Indonesia.
47
 However, as Confrontation wore on, Sukarno’s administration 
lurched ever leftwards and the PKI’s power grew dramatically, polarising Indonesian society. 
A takeover by the left or right seemed inevitable. The left blinked first: in September 1965, a 
small cabal of PKI members who were mid-level army officers, apparently operating largely 
independently, moved to pre-empt a rightist coup by arresting the army command. The plot, 
however, was poorly planned, badly botched, and swiftly suppressed by the rightist General 
Suharto. The army seized power, backed by anti-communist students, business elites, 
landlords and Islamists. A vicious anti-PKI pogrom ensued: between 500,000 and 2,500,000 
suspected communists were killed and many hundreds of thousands more imprisoned.
48
 
Suharto then terminated Confrontation. Only with this bloody transformation in the social 
complexion of the Indonesian state and the consequent curtailment of transnational 
contestation of Malaysian state-formation was the Federation’s sovereignty established.  
 
ASEAN, ‘Non-Interference’ and the Containment of Social Conflict 
 
Indonesia’s shift to the anti-communist camp created a new conjuncture where regional elites 
could use sovereignty and non-intervention to curtail transnational social conflict and thus 
ease the (re)production of capitalist social order. It was to this end that the governments of 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia formed ASEAN in 1967. The 
Association’s guiding principles of sovereignty and non-interference in states’ domestic 
affairs aimed to dampen inter-elite tensions, isolate domestic opponents from transnational 
assistance, and thereby stabilise capitalist social order. However, reflecting the always-
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partisan nature of sovereignty regimes, these regimes still admitted intervention from anti-
communist Western states, in order to further tilt the balance of forces against the left. 
 Although anti-communist forces now controlled all of ASEAN’s founding member-
states, elite fear of the left persisted. In Indonesia, despite the PKI’s evisceration, ‘the 
emergency never ended’, a constant anti-communist crusade providing the ‘raison d’être of 
the Suharto regime’.49 Singapore’s anti-communist elites had finally unleashed state 
repression against the left, creating a de facto one-party state that was staunchly anti-
communist.
50
 The rump MCP insurgency continued along the Malaysia-Thailand border, 
whilst the Thai state, dominated by military, aristocratic and business elites, confronted the 
insurgent CPT, which had ‘liberated’ several pockets of Thai territory, mainly in the 
northeast. In the Philippines, the 30,000-strong communist New People’s Army had seized 
control of central Luzon and urban student radicalism was rising, alarming the landlord-
dominated government.  
In line with the prevailing ‘domino theory’, elites believed that the continued 
suppression of leftist threats at home depended partly on events beyond their borders. The 
Chinese cultural revolution was renewing Chinese support for revolutionary forces in Asia. In 
Indochina, a transnational struggle was being waged between anti-communist regimes, 
backed by the US, and the communist forces of North Vietnam, the Viet Cong in South 
Vietnam, the Pathet Laos in Laos and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, substantially directed 
by Hanoi and aided by China and the USSR. Thailand, as the ‘frontline state’, was a 
particularly vulnerable linchpin. Thai elites feared communist victory in Indochina ‘would 
leave them boxed [in]... by borders under hostile Communist control... external support to the 
already troublesome... insurgency within Thailand would rise sharply... [creating] serious 
internal problems... [and] the whole political complexion of Thailand and her international 
posture would promptly change to a left-leaning neutralism’.51 Thai territory would transform 
from ‘a “buffer”... [to] a “conduit” for communist China and Indochina’, a Singaporean 
official warned.
52
 In turn, this would boost revolutionary forces and demoralise status-quo 
elements in other ASEAN countries. Singapore’s prime minister graphically suggested that, if 
Vietnam fell, ‘there would be fighting in Thailand within one-and-a-half to two years, in 
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Malaysia shortly thereafter, and within three years, “I would be hanging in the public 
square”’.53 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the founding ASEAN Declaration expressed elites’ 
commitment to ‘strengthening the economic and social stability of the region’.54 Singapore’s 
prime minister explained: 
 
The unspoken objective was to gain strength through solidarity ahead of the power vacuum 
that would come with an impending British and later a possible US withdrawal… We had a 
common enemy – the communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, 
China and the Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter and deny the 
communists the social and economic conditions for revolutions… We were banding 
together... for political objectives, stability and security.
55
 
 
The Declaration also founded ASEAN’s ‘non-interference principle’, expressing member-
states’ commitment ‘to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities’.56 As with most sovereignty 
claims, this presented member-states’ ‘national identities’ as already-existing, as something 
to be conserved. Actually, as we have seen, they were being coercively manufactured as part 
of capitalist state-making, and this process was being hotly contested, including by 
transnational social forces. In reality, therefore, the Declaration sought to wield sovereignty 
to insulate the ‘domestic’ politics of state formation from disruptive ‘external’ influences in 
order to strengthen conservative groups’ position in this struggle. This had both an internal 
and external application. 
 Within ASEAN, ‘non-interference’ sought to terminate destabilising intervention in 
each other’s state-making projects. As Malaysia’s prime minister observed, the only 
beneficiary of Confrontation was ‘the communist party, both in Indonesia and Malaysia’ 
which ‘welcomed this dangerous situation to win power in these two countries, then finally to 
gain control of all politics throughout Southeast Asia’ in pursuit of their ‘common dream of a 
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“Red Empire”’.57 To avoid giving ground to the left, ‘non-interference’ encouraged anti-
communist elites to shelve their disputes; this would encourage political stability, enabling 
the economic growth required to win people away from leftist politics. This restraining of 
intervention was driven by a self-interested elite belief that, because the region’s social orders 
were ‘interdependent’, ‘what happens in one ASEAN country can affect the fate of the rest’.58 
 Equally importantly, the demand for non-intervention was directed outwards, in an 
attempt to isolate ASEAN’s leftists from their allies across territorial borders. This expressed 
elites’ view of leftist movements as inherently ‘alien’ creatures of foreign powers seeking to 
‘subvert’ their social orders. As Singapore’s prime minister declared, ‘Every ASEAN 
government is convinced that its own communists are threats only because of outside 
assistance and interference’.59 Consequently, if they could only be insulated from this 
‘interference’, they could be repressed successfully. This perspective self-servingly ignored 
the roots of communist insurgency in the social and economic inequalities that emerging 
capitalist states were being used to defend, whilst legitimising the violent exclusion of critical 
voices – even moderate liberals – from state power. However, it also reflected communist 
parties’ genuinely transnational relations, described earlier. Although the material assistance, 
training and moral support from China and North Vietnam to ASEAN communist parties was 
modest, it was extensive within Indochina, and the fear was that this transboundary assistance 
would only escalate with a communist victory there. Asserting state sovereignty and non-
intervention aimed to sever these transnational linkages, thereby bolstering those struggling 
to maintain capitalist social order. For particularly paranoid anti-Chinese elites, this included 
disrupting diasporic ties seen as entwined with communism. As Suharto’s deputy intelligence 
chief put it, since support for ‘liberation movements which are trying to create communist 
governments’ was transmitted via ‘the international Chinese population split throughout [five 
areas of] Asia... our strategy is to block unification of these five elements’.60 
 Underscoring the partisan nature of this assertion of sovereignty, while non-
intervention was aimed at communist powers, intervention was still welcomed from anti-
communist allies. ASEAN’s 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality declaration 
proposed guaranteeing regional states’ sovereignty through discouraging great-power 
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interventionism. In the context of Washington’s drawdown in Vietnam, this was obviously 
directed at communist China, the great power likeliest to expand its operations. It also sought 
to persuade Vietnam – recently unified under communist rule – to distance itself from China 
and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, however, ASEAN regimes continued to host bases and US 
forces intervening in Indochina (and, as we shall see below, continued intervening there 
themselves). Similarly, ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation proposed region-
wide non-intervention after Laos and Cambodia fell to communism in 1975, hoping that the 
new regimes would not increase their transboundary support for ASEAN communist parties. 
Whilst trying to exclude transnational assistance to leftist forces, however, ASEAN’s 
sovereignty regime still admitted massive aid from external non-communist forces. The US 
in particular was deeply involved in the internal security and economic policies of regional 
states, providing extensive aid, training and advice on counter-insurgency and development 
planning to undermine the grievances fuelling leftist politics. From 1950-1983, over $72bn 
was disbursed via the Colombo Plan, much of it to Southeast Asia.
61
 The US military 
presence and bilateral aid also fuelled economic growth designed to curtail support for 
communism.
62
 Thailand, for example, hosted tens of thousands of US personnel and from 
1965-75 alone received over $2bn-worth of US assistance.
63
 The Suharto regime received 
$50bn in Western aid during the Cold War.
64
 This dwarfed the modest external assistance to 
ASEAN’s communist forces.  
 ASEAN’s Cold War sovereignty regime thus fits the general tendency described 
above, where state managers seek to restrict transnational influences that are deleterious to 
the (re)production of orders they favour, whilst admitting those that support it. As we shall 
now see, intervention was also used to complement the ordering functions of sovereignty. 
   
Intervention and Containment in Indochina 
 
The use of intervention to coercively mediate the contradiction between territorial 
sovereignty and transnational social forces is clearly apparent in the record of ASEAN states’ 
interventions in Indochina. In addition to invoking non-interference to curtail transnational 
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linkages between opposition forces, anti-communist elites also intervened to sever them by 
preventing the rise of communist regimes in Indochina that would provide cross-border 
assistance to ASEAN’s leftists. This was again guided by the ‘domino theory’ that, if one 
society fell to communism, this would strategically advantage fellow-travellers in 
neighbouring countries whilst demoralising defenders of the status quo, making communist 
victory more likely there also. ASEAN states’ interventions thus sought to manage order not 
merely in the target states, but – more importantly – domestically.  
 Belief in the ‘domino theory’ made the region’s non-communist states early 
supporters of US containment interventions in Indochina. Having earlier sent forces to Korea, 
in 1966 Thailand and the Philippines also despatched combat troops and support units 
respectively to fight the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Manila had despatched civil assistance 
as early as 1953 to ‘contribute to the South Vietnamese fight against communism’.65 The 
Malaysian government also transferred military equipment left over from the Emergency to 
Saigon, in addition to training and civil assistance.
66
 Singapore, unable, like Malaysia, to 
despatch troops for fear of a domestic leftist backlash, offered bilateral aid to help resist 
communism in urban areas.
67
 Thailand also intervened heavily in Laos and Cambodia. 
Fearing that their neutralist governments were not stemming the tide of communism, 
Bangkok sponsored rightist guerrilla movements and assassination plots against government 
leaders.
68
 From 1960 onwards, Thailand also intervened militarily in Laos. By 1971-1972, it 
had deployed over 23,000 clandestine troops, disguised as Laotians, to fight the Pathet Laos, 
stiffen anti-communist forces, and train ethnic minorities as anti-communist guerrillas.
69
  
The animus of this intervention was not simply anti-communist ideology or solidarity 
but elites’ belief that, due to societal interdependencies in Southeast Asia, allowing Indochina 
to turn communist would destabilise their own societies. A direct route would be opened up 
from China, enabling Indochinese communists to provide cross-border assistance to the CPT 
and other communist parties. Insurgent forces would be inspired to step up their activities, 
whilst establishment forces’ will to resist would be drastically weakened. Intervention thus 
sought to contain communism in Indochina to curtail its transnational links to ASEAN 
communism. The Thai government described intervening in Vietnam as an attempt ‘to 
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extinguish a fire that has already broken out [abroad] before it reaches our home’.70 Likewise, 
Malaysia’s prime minister explained that it supported Saigon because ‘we both faced a 
common enemy’. If Indochina fell to communism, ‘the communists would press on against 
the rest of Southeast Asia’. Vietnam ‘was not simply a civil war’, because order elsewhere in 
the region was at stake. Reflecting the interdependence of social orders, Malaysia’s ‘national 
security’ involved not merely ‘internal security but also the security of Southeast Asia’.71 A 
similar logic applied to support for American military intervention. Singapore’s prime 
minister candidly observed: ‘millions of Vietnamese are dying... not for Vietnam, but to 
ensure that what is happening in Vietnam is not repeated in the other countries of Southeast 
Asia’.72 
 The faltering US war effort was, however, accompanied by growing social unrest in 
the ASEAN states. Following communal riots in 1969, which the Malaysian government 
blamed on Chinese communist subversion,
73
 emergency rule was introduced, and anti-
communist dictatorships were established in Thailand and the Philippines in 1971 and 1972. 
Correspondingly, ASEAN states’ containment interventions escalated. Under Suharto, 
Indonesia now became involved. In 1970, Indonesian military intelligence encouraged a US-
backed coup in Cambodia whereby General Lon Nol overthrew the neutralist Prince 
Sihanouk.
74
 Suharto also covertly armed the new regime, provided counter-insurgency 
training, rallied foreign aid for Lon Nol, lobbied for the deployment of ‘peacekeepers’ in 
Cambodia, and offered its own ‘peacekeepers’ to South Vietnam to resist a communist 
takeover.
75
 Meanwhile, in addition to its covert forces in Laos, Thailand trained Cambodians 
to fight for Lon Nol, and even contemplated invading Cambodia.
76
 Again, this intervention 
aimed to maintain social order outside of Indochina. Suharto explained that ‘if Cambodia 
falls into Communist hands, it will be an expanded base for guerrilla and infiltration 
activities’ against neighbouring countries.77 This was a concern for the ASEAN ‘dominoes’, 
but also ultimately Indonesia itself. The regime still feared, Suharto’s intelligence chief 
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reported, that there were ‘one and a half million undeclared communists in Indonesia’,78 
awaiting an opportunity to revive, and officials expected intensified Chinese subversion ‘to 
erode the bulwark [of regional anti-communism] as early as possible’.79 For Suharto, the 
collapse of Indochina’s non-communist regimes in 1975 merely confirmed these fears. 
ASEAN’s electrified leftists had ‘stepped up their activities’, Suharto warned US President 
Ford; ‘insurgency has now reached the national capitals in Thailand and Malaysia’, which 
could ‘bring the Communists right to our threshold’.80 It was merely a matter of time, he 
believed, before Vietnam intensified its ‘communist missionary activities’ towards ASEAN.81 
Actually, however, revolutionary pressures eased after 1975 due to escalating intra-
communist conflicts. China’s cultural revolution had ebbed away and, under the increasingly 
rightist Deng Xiaoping regime, Beijing became less interested in revolutionary 
internationalism than its rivalry with Moscow. Backed by China, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge 
regime became increasingly hostile towards Soviet-aligned Vietnam, believing it sought to 
dominate a revived Indochinese Federation. ASEAN elites, courted by both sides, benefited 
as the Indochinese states pledged to practice non-interference, cut aid to the CPT and even 
collaborated in its suppression. Singapore’s prime minister saw the Khmer Rouge as a 
potential replacement ‘buffer’ between ASEAN and Vietnam, their dispute ‘buy[ing] us 
considerable time’ to defeat domestic communism.82  
However, in December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, toppling Pol Pot and 
installing a friendly replacement. The forces of the region’s vanguard revolutionary state 
were now directly adjacent to Thailand, raising the spectre of renewed transnational 
assistance to the CPT. Thailand’s deputy prime minister stated that Hanoi’s previous 
‘assurance... that the Vietnamese would not interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs or support 
subversive movements... could no longer be credited’.83 As Britain’s ambassador in Hanoi 
observed, it was instead ‘time to dust down the Domino Theory... [Vietnam’s] leaders believe 
in revolution and will certainly continue their policy of aiding and abetting it in other 
countries... The next target of opportunity for Vietnam is Thailand. For that very reason the 
reaction of Thailand and other ASEAN countries to the invasion of Cambodia has been one 
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of considerable alarm’.84 Singapore’s foreign minister concurred: ‘the next step would be 
Thailand’.85  
In order to contain this threat to capitalist social order, ASEAN intervened to restore a 
physical barrier between the CPT and Vietnam by perpetuating a Cambodian civil war.
86
 As 
Thailand’s supreme army commander explained, ‘having lost Cambodia as a buffer, the best 
that Thailand could do was to sustain the fighting that in itself constituted a buffer’.87 For 
over a decade, Thailand hosted and sheltered Khmer Rouge and anti-communist guerrillas, 
militarily supporting their cross-border raids. Bangkok was aided by China, which saw 
Vietnam’s invasion as a Soviet proxy move and was determined to rescue its Cambodian 
allies. Thailand agreed to ship $100m of Chinese arms to the Khmer Rouge annually in 
exchange for China severing aid to the CPT and later ASEAN’s other communist parties. 
Ironically, by slavishly supporting Beijing and opposing Hanoi’s ‘hegemonism’, ASEAN’s 
communists had set themselves up to be cut loose in this manner, and fell into disarray. 
Singapore, Malaysia and the US also materially assisted the non-communist guerrillas. Aid 
for Cambodian refugees was diverted to keep the civil war going, whilst ASEAN preserved 
Cambodia’s UN seat for the Khmer Rouge. ASEAN later forced the Khmer Rouge to accept 
non-communists into a new coalition ‘government in exile’, to help lever these groups back 
to power in Phnom Penh. This eventually succeeded when the conflict was settled in 1991. 
Cold War Southeast Asia thus exhibits the key features of sovereignty and 
intervention described in the earlier theoretical section. Sovereignty was not simply the 
expression of completed national self-determination; the extent and complexion of the 
region’s postcolonial states were being hotly contested, including by transnational social 
forces. Sovereignty and ‘non-interference’ were instead deployed as part of the ‘will to 
order’. Capitalist state-makers invoked them to sever transnational support for their leftist 
opponents, whilst admitting assistance to themselves. Simultaneously, intervention was used 
to coercively mediate the contradiction between territorial state formation and transnational 
social relations. ASEAN states intervened against communism in Indochina, not simply to 
manage social order there, but in order to weaken the left at home by minimising the 
‘contagion’ of revolution. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article argued that practices of sovereignty and intervention are both part of the modern 
‘will to order’ and should be traced and evaluated in relation to struggles over what sort of 
order should prevail in a given territory. At stake in whether sovereignty should be respected 
or violated is what forces and resources should be admitted to these struggles. Asserting 
territorial sovereignty attempts to contain conflict to a national scale, delegitimising and 
severing transnational conflicts and linkages and thereby shifting the balance of forces 
against groups relying on transnational support. Conversely, intervention widens the scope of 
conflict to include new agents, altering the balance again. Forces contesting order seek 
patterns of sovereignty and intervention that admit their allies but exclude their enemies’. The 
transnational dimensions of social conflict are highlighted during revolutionary periods, when 
local conflicts become articulated within and shaped by broader conflicts beyond state 
borders. This interdependence generates imperatives to intervene: revolutionaries and 
counter-revolutionaries band together transnationally, bolstering their allies to stabilise or 
transform order not merely in the target society but also elsewhere, including their own.  
 Although a desire to maintain or transform social order can explain why some 
interventions occur, it is beyond this article’s scope to assess properly whether interventions 
actually succeed in attaining this goal. The record is arguably poor: US intervention in Laos 
and Cambodia, for example, is often said to have undermined popular support for neutralist 
regimes and driven their governments leftward; and, of course, Indochina eventually fell to 
communism. However, as Sutayut observes of Thai involvement in Laos, intervention ‘was 
not useless... [it] prolonged the life of... [a non-communist] regime, giving time for Thailand 
to improve its economy, to develop its remote areas... to strengthen... against communist 
threats’.88 Similarly, it would be surprising if the vast quantities of military and economic 
assistance accompanying anti-communist intervention in Indochina did not bolster non-
communist forces elsewhere in the region. US military spending amounted to 8.5 percent of 
Thai GDP in the 1960s, generating an economic boom that was arguably critical in winning 
people away from communism.
89
 The tacit ASEAN-China alliance over Cambodia in the 
1980s also arguably stabilised domestic orders within ASEAN. Pro-Beijing communist 
parties were thrown into confusion, suffered serious splits, and were soon abandoned 
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altogether by China, hastening their demise.
90
 Conversely, the counter-revolutionary Thai 
government received $283m in Chinese aid from 1985-1989, plus generous US assistance.
91
 
Certainly many ASEAN diplomats believe that containment interventions worked: as one 
boasts, the dominoes had been poised to topple, ‘but we managed to stop it at Laos-
Cambodia’.92 Whether this is accurate is a complex question requiring further research. If it 
is, it is worth underscoring that the price of stabilising capitalist social order in one part of 
Southeast Asia was millions of deaths in another. 
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